The Feedback of Inequality: Policy Patterns, Power Resources and Institutional  Redesign in the United States by Kuipers, Feike
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Feedback of Inequality:  
Policy Patterns, Power Resources and Institutional Redesign  
in the United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master thesis FA Kuipers 
Research Master Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Dr. F. de Zwart 
Second reader: Dr. A.W. Chalmers 
1 
 
The Feedback of Inequality: Policy Patterns, Power 
Resources and Institutional Redesign in the United 
States 
Feike A. Kuipers 
University of Leiden 
  
In politics the rules of the policy formation process are endogenous to the political process 
itself and play an important role in determining which social group wins or loses. As a result 
redesigning institutions is a valuable policy objective for interest groups. Altering the 
institutions governing the rules of politics creates the possibility for a strong positive 
feedback loop: the social group determining the output of the policy formation process can 
change the rules of the policy formation process to solidify its own position. To substantiate 
this I examine the policy objectives of interest groups in the United States using the 
Historical Institutional method. By combining the Power Resource Theory and institutional 
theories the asymmetric power relation between corporate interest groups and unions is 
linked to institutional redesign that favors the more powerful corporate interest groups. 
Corporate interest groups use their influence to keep the system of interest representation 
unorganized and financial contributions to political entities unregulated. By realizing these 
policy objectives corporate interest groups have ensured that the rules of influencing the 
policy formation process are in their favor. These favorable rules have increased the 
efficiency of converting their power resources into influence and thereby increase the 
probability of corporate interest groups being successful in future contests over policies. 
Introduction 
Income inequality is without a doubt a trending topic; even conservative organizations as IMF and 
the World Economic Forum have given the debate about income inequality a prominent position. The 
debate is important as income inequality slows economic growth and undermines long-term 
economic and political stability (Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014). The problem will only get worse 
for Western countries since income inequality has been rising steadily (see Table 1)1. However, the 
response to rising income inequality has not been the same in all regions and different patterns of 
redistributive policies can be identified2. In Anglo-American countries, like the United States, Great 
Britain and Canada, primary and post-tax income is unequally distributed. At the same time the 
redistributive efforts of these governments have increased only relatively little in the past decades. 
Approximately the opposite can be found in Nordic countries like Sweden, Denmark and Norway. 
                                                        
1 Income inequality refers to the P90/P10 ratio of disposable incomes after taxes and redistribution; primary 
incomes to the total income generated on the market through wages and investment income; and 
redistribution to the percentage of GDP spent by the state on public expenditures through tax rebates, 
subsidies, public services and welfare. 
2 A policy pattern is the continuation of a policy or comparable polies over a prolonged period of time. 
ABSTRACT 
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Primary income is distributed relatively equally in these countries and their redistributive efforts 
have increased faster than in most other countries (Barth and Moene 2009). Lindert (2004) has 
labeled this counter-intuitive relationship the “Robin Hood Paradox”: redistribution is mostly absent 
where it is needed the most and present where it is needed the least. 
The exact nature of the pattern of primary income distribution and redistributive policies is 
disputed. Generally speaking there are three different theories explaining why governments enact 
redistributive policies. Explanations using the voter-politician connection based on the Median Voter 
Theorem (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Moene and Wallerstein 2001). The Power Resource Theory uses 
the influence of different social groups to explain why certain policies are adopted and others not 
(Korpi 1983, 2006; Bradley et al. 2003; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Gilens and Page 2014). Finally, 
institutional theories focus on how the design of a political institution determines the outcome 
(Tsebelis 1995, 2002; Huber and Stephens 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2006). 
Contributing to this debate, I propose an explanation for the Robin Hood Paradox by 
combining elements of the Power Resource Theory and institutional theories. Using the Historical 
Institutionalism method, policies affecting income inequality are linked to the resources of different 
social groups. This reveals a self-reproducing pattern. In other words, social groups that realize a 
policy goal become relatively stronger because of the benefits these policies deliver to themselves. 
This increases the probability of reproducing comparable policies in the future. Additionally, social 
groups will not only try to influence policies affecting the distribution of resources but also the 
institutions regulating the interactions between society and politics. These institutions can be 
regarded as intervening variables that determine the eventual effectiveness of the power resources 
used and because of this which group is influential and which not. This makes these institutions 
valuable policy objectives (Steinmo and Tolbert 1998). This creates the incentive for interest groups 
to redesign institutions to ensure that their power resources will be converted into political influence 
more effectively. For instance, American corporate interest groups have targeted the regulation of 
financial contributions. By limiting the regulation of financial contributions corporate interest groups 
could use their comparative advantage – financial resources – more effectively to realize policy goals 
The unexpected policy pattern of The Robin Hood Paradox and the described importance of 
institutions in determining which social group are in a position to influence policies lead to the 
central research question: to what extent has institutional redesign affected the conversion of 
resources into political influence and thereby the capability of these social groups to reproduce 
policies that serve their respective interest vis-à-vis other social groups. I will answer this question by 
exploring if, and how, corporate interest groups in the United States used their prominent position to 
redesign political institutions in order to increase their influence on the policy formation process in 
the period 1975-1985. The United States is selected as case because the Robin Hood Paradox can be 
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observed most prominently here. Income inequality in the US has increased substantial in the past 
thirty years (Piketty 2014, 24). At the same time the percentage of Americans in favor of more 
redistributive policies has steadily increased. In 2007 for the first time a majority of Americans was in 
favor of more redistribution by the state (Pierson and Hacker 2010, 50). The lack of responsiveness of 
the American government is often attributed to the prominent position of corporate interest groups. 
A position they captures during the “new” American activist state’s formative years 1975-1985 (Vogel 
1989; Skocpol and Pierson 2007; Hacker and Pierson 2010). My hypothesis is that to solidify their 
position as most influential interest group, corporate interest groups did not only realize policy 
objectives influencing the distribution of resources, but also redesigned the policy process itself. 
The arguments to answer the main question is presented in four steps. First, the theories 
explaining the different patterns of income inequality are reviewed. Then the implications and 
explanatory value of institutional alterations are explained while using the Historical Institutionalism 
method. Next the severity of the Robin Hood Paradox in the United States and the prominent 
position of corporate interest groups in America is demonstrated using indicators derived from 
earlier studies on interest groups. Finally, two American cases, the conversion of resources into 
political influence and the structure of the government-interest group relations, are examined to 
determine if and to which extent a feedback process through institutional redesign has contributed 
to sustaining power relations and the realization of policy goals for influential interest groups. 
Table 1 – Gini Index of Household Inequality and Redistribution 
 Level in 1985 Average change  
per decade 
n* 
Pre-tax and transfer inequality (Gini Coefficients)    
   Nordic 30.9 2.2 24 
   Continental Europe 33.9 1.3 33 
   Anglo-American Countries 37.7 3.4 41 
Redistribution (Reduction in poverty)    
   Nordic 33% 2.4% 24 
   Continental Europe 24% 2.2% 33 
   Angle-American Countries 21% 1.9% 41 
Post-tax and transfer inequality (Gini Coefficients)    
   Nordic 20.5 0.7 24 
   Continental Europe 25.6 0.6 33 
   Angle-American Countries 29.6 2.0 41 
Numbers are based on the Gini index of household inequality as provided by the Luxembourg Income Study and collected 
by David Adamany (1986). 
* N is the number of measurements in all countries of a group. The number of measurements per individual country varies 
from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 7.  
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Explanations for the Patterns of Income Inequality and Redistribution 
The different patterns of income inequality have often been explained on the basis of technological 
developments or the globalization of the economy. The dominant explanation for the rising income 
inequality in past decades has been the “skill based technological change explanation” (Berman, 
Bound, and Machin 1998; Goldin and Katz 2008). The essence of this explanation is that technological 
developments have had different effects on different groups of workers. Some workers saw their 
market position improve while others experienced a decline in their market position. “The economic 
globalization explanation” follows the same logic. In the global economy part of the workers had to 
compete with labor forces from abroad while others were shielded from competition by regulation 
or their education. Given the weakness of these theories in explaining the different income of 
workers with the same skills or workers under comparable global pressure, scholars have turned 
their attention to political explanations (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 154). Governments have an 
enormous influence on income distribution, both by shaping primary incomes through 
“marketconditioning” policies (Kelly 2008) and by implementing policies that redistribute income to 
adjust for undesirability in primary income distributions. Such policies can explain why certain groups 
saw their income rise and others experienced a decline in income. 
One of the most effective tools that a Government has to adjust the distribution of income is 
the instrument of redistribution. While redistribution is an effective tool to decrease income 
inequality not all governments have governments implement more redistributive policies to correct 
for primary income inequality than others. Why governments use redistribution differently is fiercely 
debated by scholars in several fields. There are generally three different theories explaining why 
governments implement redistributive policies: models based on the Median Voter Theorem, Power 
Resource approaches and Institutional explanations.  
Given the important role that voters and the preferences of voters have been given in 
political science, it is not surprising that explanations of income inequality are based on studies 
concerning voters. The most prominent voter driven theory of income inequality is based on the 
Median Voter Theory. The central argument of this theory is that redistributive policies become 
popular once the income of the median voter is below the average income (Roberts 1977; Meltzer 
and Richard 1981). However, the Median Voter Theorem faces a dilemma: not in all countries does 
an increase in income inequality actually lead to more redistributive policies (Mahler and Jesuit 2006). 
The lack of response of governments to an increasing income inequality, even when desired by the 
majority of the population, is a puzzle. It is called the Robin Hood Paradox. This phenomenon  cannot 
easily be explained by the Median Voter Theory (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 164). 
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Several scholars have responded to this shortcoming of the Median Voter Theory by 
amending it. One of the first responses was to uncouple income inequality and the median voter 
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). The median citizen in a country might have seen his relative 
income decrease but the median voter did not. The explanation for this is the influx of low-skilled 
immigrants that cannot or do not work and because people with lower incomes in general vote less 
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 118). The result is that the income of the median voter is 
higher than that of the median citizen. This in turn reduces the pressure on politicians to implement 
policies that diminish income inequality. However, the decline of relative income of the median 
citizen has been so dramatically in some countries since the seventies that such an explanation 
becomes practically impossible. For this explanation to hold there has to be an enormous amount of 
low-income citizens that do not vote to seriously reduce the pressure on politicians. Another problem 
is that income is more and more concentrated in the top 1%, or even in the top 0.1%, of income 
earners. A high concentration of income in the top 1% increases the probability that the rest of the 
population would benefit from redistributive policies. Even with a significant part of the bottom 
income earners not voting the high concentrations of income in the top 1% should still lead to 
pressure on politicians to redistribute according to the Median Voter Theorem. 
An additional modification of the Median Voter Theory is based on the conception that the 
median voter’s income might relatively have decreased, but that voters are not informed enough to 
be really concerned about this (Bartels 2008). This modification is based on the assumption that 
politicians have been skillful enough to deflect the attention of voters to other issues. This would give 
voters the idea that their economic situation has actually been improving instead of deteriorating. 
Such an explanation would explain the lack of pressure to reduce income inequality while staying 
true to the Median Voter Theory. However, this leaves unanswered why politicians would behave in 
such a way. Simply responding to the preference of the median voters is simpler than creating a lot of 
smoke and mirrors to trick voters into voting on them. There has to be a reason why politicians 
would not want to implement policies that reduce income inequality and convince voters of this. 
Therefore, other political agents than voters might have influence on the behavior of politicians. 
Another important limitation of the voter based models is that it rests on a majoritarian 
conception of the political process. Voter based models posit that the median voter determines the 
outcome of elections and that politicians subsequently cater to the preferences of the median voter. 
While such an approach is appealing from a normative perspective, the empirical and theoretical 
proof that citizens determine political preferences is weak. Gilens and Page (2014) have 
demonstrated that in the United States government policies are closer to the preferences of 
economic elites and corporate interests groups than to the preferences of the voters. The struggle 
over government policies also brings the large asymmetries of information, organization and 
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intensity between the different groups to the forefront (Hacker and Pierson 2014, 649). Voters are 
unorganized, dispersed and have short time horizons. Organizations on the other hand have 
substantial organization capabilities, high levels of information and extended time horizons. These 
characteristics favor organized interests groups in altering government policies.  
The proposition that policy outcomes that shape the market or redistribute income are 
related to the power of groups is closely associated in the comparative welfare-state literature with 
the Power Resources Theory (PRT), as developed by Korpi (1983, 2006). In his work Korpi considers 
trade unions as representatives of working-class interests in the democratic class struggle. The 
unions strive to realize social welfare policies that insure workers against the vicissitudes of the 
market, reduce their dependence on employment and redistribute income and consumption 
opportunities. Groups whose members do not depend primarily on wages are labeled “capital” in 
PRT and in general resist the expansion of a public welfare system. Which policies are eventually 
enacted depends on the distribution of power resources over the social groups. The balance of 
power between social groups provides a persuasive explanation for the aforementioned ‘Robin Hood 
Paradox’. In the PRT framework strong unions provide for both a relatively low primary wage 
inequality through collective bargaining and redistributive policies by pressuring governments. 
Organizations representing capital promote the opposite. The inverse relationship between primary 
income inequality and redistribution is thus a spurious relationship, as both are the result of the 
distribution of power resources over social groups3. 
Of the three explanations the institutional theories offer the most diverse approach to 
explaining differences in redistribution policies. Central in every variety of this approach is the 
argument that formalized institutional arrangements, the ‘rules of the game’, influence policy 
outcomes. Policies can also be considered institutions if these constrain or shape the subsequent 
strategic options of political actors. Once created institutions alter the system of interest 
representation. As a consequence interest groups change behavior, new interest groups join or leave 
and the relationship between interest groups is redefined. Different institutional settings lead to 
different incentives for politicians and thereby explain differences in policies between countries. 
According to the institutional approach, the cross-national differences in redistributive policies are 
the result of the structure of the welfare state programs at its origin, the number of veto points that 
can stop alteration of the program and the dispersion of benefits of the program over different social 
groups. Examples of this approach are the study of why certain New Deal policies have flourished and 
others not (Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988), how an institutional design of the decision-making 
                                                        
3 It is never specified what power resources exactly are. In this paper they are considered organization 
capabilities that can be used to influence the policy process. Power resources and organizational capabilities 
should thus be read as being interchangeable. 
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process can lead to different policy outcomes (Immergut 1992) and how gender related issues can 
affect policy developments (Orloff 1993). 
In addition to how policies institutionalize several empirical studies have demonstrated that 
state structures can have a significant and robust effect on welfare spending (Steinmo and Tolbert 
1998). Federal states have, in comparison with unitary states, less redistribution (e.g.Huber and 
Stephens 2001). This effect is the result of competition between sub-state units for capital and the 
fear of attracting welfare recipients. Federalism also increases the number of access points for special 
interests and is characterized by more veto-points, leading to a status-quo bias (Immergut 1992; 
Tsebelis 1995). While the influence of federalism on the welfare state is broadly accepted, the role of 
electoral rules is more contested. Countries with proportional representation typically have more 
redistributive welfare policies than countries with single-member plurality election rules (Persson 
and Tabellini 2003; Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Another strand of institutional research focuses on 
how proportional electoral systems tend to induce politicians to create broad based and inclusive 
spending programs and plurality elections lead to geographically targeted spending. There is a 
correlation between electoral systems and redistributive policies, but the causal mechanism of how 
electoral systems lead to redistributive policies is not yet fully theorized – led alone proven 
empirically. 
 
Power Resources, Institutions and Feedback Processes 
The listed research into primary income inequality and redistribution has increased the 
understanding of the political origin of income inequality and different redistribution policies. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical approaches listed still have substantial shortcomings. Models based on 
the electoral connection neglect almost everything outside the voter-politician relationship, which is 
– to say the least – at odds with empirical findings (Gilens and Page 2014). Corrections applied to the 
Median Voter Theory might increase its ability to predict reality, but do so by undermining the 
fundamental principle of voter influence. Correcting the model by assuming that voters are not well 
informed and can be misled by politicians demonstrates that other political agents are shaping the 
preferences of politicians. PRT might not be as parsimonious as electoral models, but research has 
demonstrated that its more inclusive approach represents the political reality more accurately 
(Gilens and Page 2014; Pierson and Hacker 2010). A shortcoming of PRT is that the power position of 
groups are endogenous to the theory. Groups have a power relation and from that flows policy 
choices. However, policies realized affect the relative power relation between groups. As 
Schattschneider (1935) said “Policies create politics”. Policies can affect how resources are 
distributed over the different social groups, be an incentive for social groups to increase their 
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organizational capacities or alter how social groups interact with government. Therefore PRT should 
not only be concerned with the relative power positions of groups and which group succeeds to 
influence the policy process, but also with how policy choices affects social groups. The feedback 
loop of the historical institutional method can provide this feedback process.  
An adequate explanation of primary income inequality and distribution levels should thus be 
based on more than “just” the election cycle. It should not only explain why extreme unequal 
situations can develop but also how these be maintained. This is done by taking into account how 
policy choices feed back into the positions of interest groups. The historical institutionalist method 
can fulfill these requirements by combining how rational groups strive to realize policy goals (PRT) 
while acting in an environment with constraints based on power relations between the social groups 
and the political institutions in a dynamic model. Rational agents achieve policy goals that affect the 
distribution of power resources over society. This feeds back into the capacities of agents to 
influence the policy process in the future. This explains why certain groups not only continuously 
manage to bend the policy process in their favor, but also why such patterns become more stable 
over time. A group in a prominent position can use its influence to improve its position. Using a 
feedback process has the advantage of being able to explain stable institutional patterns, like 
increasing primary income inequality and low redistribution or low inequality and high distribution, 
from seemingly neutral starting points. The stability of these patterns depends on cyclical processes 
that lock-in or reproduce the pattern. In this process policy choices shaping the relation between 
groups in the early stages shape the path to come. Further into the process the path is already 
determined and inertia sets in. The process of reproduction keeps it on track and continues towards 
its outcome (Mahoney 2000, 510-511).  
In politics a chosen path often is stable because of the prominence of collective action 
problems, high institutional density, the general opacity of politics, and asymmetrical political 
authority and power (Pierson 2000, 257). Once a certain policy has been enacted it is often hard to 
reverse and it will influence subsequent choices. Asymmetric power relations can also be the result 
of the policies implemented. If a social group is in a position powerful enough to reach a policy 
objective, realizing that objective will further strengthen it and create obstacles to future change. The 
results of a positive feedback process is an increased probability of reproducing the preferred 
policies. Social groups that benefit from income inequality and low redistribution will use their 
power, which is partially based on income inequality and low redistribution, to at least continue 
policies as little social security, low taxation and few regulations of businesses. Such dynamics are 
intensified in politics by the lack of efficiency enhancing mechanisms as competition and learning. 
Once a policy has been enacted it is often difficult to evaluate how it performed. For politicians it is 
most times also not beneficial to evaluate policies. Undoing earlier policy choices means one has to 
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admit that earlier choices were wrong and it requires a contest with those that benefit from the 
policy (Pierson 2000, 257). Policies thus are fairly stable because of their feedback process. 
Where most literature on power resources and income inequality use a narrative that can be 
read as a positive feedback process between policies and relative power resources, the institutional 
structure used is a fixed intermediating variable. Whereas the institutional structure that determines 
how, and which, social groups can influence the policy process is not exogenous to the policy 
process. The rules guiding how social groups and politicians interact with each other are a result of 
the policy process itself. Therefore, institutional alterations should also be part of the explanation in 
a historical institutionalist method incorporating a feedback loop. Powerful groups are in the position 
to change the rules of the game into their favor. Such alterations can be far more consequential than 
policies that change the distribution of resources (Hacker and Pierson 2014, 649). The institutions 
that regulate how social groups can interact with the policy formation process can be regarded as 
intervening variables. Institutions can enhance the effectiveness of resources and/or groups and 
diminish the effectiveness of others. In the most extreme case, when the institutional structure 
determines exactly which social group is allowed to be part of the policy formation process, the 
institutional structure completely negates the relative power position of the different groups. Given 
the importance of institutions and resources the expectation is that powerful social groups will create 
policies that improve their relative power position and redesign the institutional structure that 
determines how social power is converted into influence on the legislative process.  
 
The Robin Hood Paradox in America and the Rise of Corporate Interest Groups  
If, and how, social groups strive to realize policies that improve their power position and alter the 
institutional structure in their favor is examined by exploring developments in the United States. The 
United States is the “ideal” case for examining if a high income inequality and low redistribution 
policy pattern has been accompanied by institutional alterations. The first reason is that regardless of 
which measurement is used – 80/20, 90/10, top 1% or Gini coefficients and welfare as percentage of 
GDP, reduction of Gini through redistribution or reduction in poverty – the US has the highest income 
inequality and the lowest redistribution (in comparison with other OECD countries). At the same time 
a majority of Americans do want the government to redistribute income for the purpose of reducing 
economic inequality. During the great depression 35% of the people agreed with the strong 
statement that “government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich”. In 1998 this 
percentage had increased to 45% and in 2007 a majority of the people (56%), agreed with the same 
statement (Pierson and Hacker 2010, 50). The low level of redistribution in the United States while 
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the public opinion is in favor of redistribution indicate that the policy pattern must be rigid in the 
United States. 
 The United States is also a country where politicians do not shy away from changing 
the institutional structure if this benefits themselves. Politicians gerrymander their districts and 
change who has access to the ballot box or how voters are converted into seats to ensure their own 
political survival. Given the political culture that altering the rules of the political game are 
considered part of the spoils as winner, it is reasonable to expect that interest groups also try to 
realize this. Thus institutional alterations are more likely in the United States than in many other 
countries. Both the level of income inequality and lack of increase in redistribution, and the 
acceptance of changing the rules of the political game make the United States a case where 
institutional alterations are most likely to have occurred. In case institutional redesign didn’t 
contribute to reproducing the pattern of policies that sustain or increase income inequality in the US, 
it is unlikely that it did so in other countries. 
According to PRT the policy pattern of high income inequality and low redistribution is the 
result of the relative power resources of different social groups in the United States. Earlier studies 
into the relative power position of different social groups have demonstrated that corporate interest 
groups in the United States have a prominent position. The prominent position of corporate interest 
groups is in most studies traced back to the organizational transformation that took place in the 
1970s (Vogel 1989; Skocpol and Pierson 2007; Hacker and Pierson 2010). This organizational 
transformation is characterized by “the decline of labor and rise of organized business, the shift away 
from mass-membership and locally rooted political organizations toward centralized mailing-list, and 
the increasing importance of money in political life” (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 179). This 
transformation has led to a large asymmetry of information, organization capacities and intensity of 
pressuring government between organized interests groups. The asymmetry of capacities between 
organized interest groups has led to a difference in outside pressure – letters, media attention – and 
inside pressure – relationships between interest groups and politicians, and flows of information. 
The transformation of interest groups started during the 1760s as social movements 
descended upon Washington D.C. and nationalized several social issues. In the late sixties and early 
seventies the federal state got involved in multiple social-economic and regulatory questions. This 
led to the breaking up of old patterns (Schattschneider 1975) and the birth of the “activist state” in 
the United States (Skocpol and Pierson 2007). The “new” activist state forged by social movements 
was initially responsive to these movements. Civil rights and peace movements were enormously 
influential and successful in realizing their policy goals. Subsequently several other grassroots 
movements expected to replicate these successes: the women’s movement, the greens, the anti-
nuclear movement, the lesbian and gay movement, and the unions, all turned to Washington. The 
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victory of the Democratic Party in 1976, with the help of many of these organizations, bolstered the 
expectations even further. However, these expectations did not materialize. Under President Carter a 
tax reform proposal was defeated, the creation of a new consumer protection agency blocked, an 
election day voter registration law didn’t even make it out of committee and a proposal to peg the 
minimum wage to the average manufacturing wage was also defeated on the floor of Congress. The 
main reason for this string of unexpected defeats was the growing influence of corporate interest 
groups (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 156). 
The larger developments initiating the rise of corporate interest groups during the seventies 
are the changing economic circumstances and the new prominence of the federal state (Skocpol and 
Pierson 2007; Hacker and Pierson 2010). Until the seventies the economic growth in the United 
States was high and relatively stable. Prosperity grew and there was plenty to go around. During the 
seventies however this all came to a stop. The Vietnam War led to budget deficits while the oil crises 
slowed economic growth and increased inflation. Corporations relied on the federal government to 
solve these issues. The federal government had also become more influential. During the sixties and 
early seventies the federal state expanded immensely. President Johnson created Medicare and 
Medicaid. President Nixon doubled down on this and extended social security for retirees and 
created many of the Government agencies that are still active today. Under pressure of social groups 
the American State had become a “new, modern” activist state. For a brief period the federal 
government became an activist state that was not friendly to American business. Supreme Court 
Justice Lewis Powell warned in 1971 that “the American economic system is under attack. Business 
must learn the lesson, political power is necessary” (Quoted inPierson and Hacker 2010, 117). 
Corporations feared for more interfere in the economy by the federal government. Interference that 
would not be in their favor. 
The significance of this change in Washington D.C. cannot be overstated. In an influential 
study published in 1963, Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1963) conclude that they were surprised by the low 
level of visible business participation in federal politics. Most firms did not have representatives in 
Washington D.C and those that were lobbying were ill-informed and tended to be poor on resources. 
However, during the seventies this completely changed. Corporation moved to D.C, acting both 
independently and collectively, and increased their visibility. Corporations en masse opened offices in 
D.C. in their attempt to influence the policy agenda. This is illustrated by the fact that in 1968 less 
than 100 corporations had an office in D.C., by 1987 this number had increased to over 500. In 1971 
only 175 firms had a registered lobbyist in D.C., while in 1982 over 2500 corporations had at least one 
lobbyist working for them in D.C. (Pierson and Hacker 2010, 118). 
Besides moving to D.C., corporate organizations also established and funded Political Action 
Committees (PACs). “A dialogue with a politician is fine,” according to a corporate executive “but 
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with a little money they hear you better” (As quoted in Gray and Lowery 1997, 322). Table 2 shows 
the number and type of PACs active in D.C. The rise of corporate PACs, both stock and non-stock, is 
immense. The amount of money disbursed by PACs to influence politics also exploded. As can be 
seen in Table 3 the budget of all PACs rose from $21 million in 1974 to $265 million in 1984 (Vogel 
1996, 148). A rise of 1100% in only 12 years. During these years the share of labor related PACs and 
labor contributions diminished yearly. Where labor had been a prominent player in the early 
seventies it was soon outmatched by corporate groups. The historically unprecedented level of 
corporate political activity at the federal level also showed no signs of abating. The political 
mobilization by corporate interests had become a permanent feature of American politics. 
Table 2 - Growth in number of Political Action Committees since 1974 by type 
Type 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
Corporate 89 433 785 1.206 1.469 1.682 
Labor 201 224 217 297 390 394 
Nonconnected   162 374 723 1.053 
Cooperative   12 42 47 52 
Nonstock corporation   24 56 103 130 
Total 608 1.146 1.653 2.551 3.371 4.009 
Source: “FEC says PACs top 4.000 for 1984” (Federal Election Committee 1985). 
Table 3 – Total PACs Disbursements by Type of PAC (In millions of dollars and in percentages of 
total) 
Type 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
 Amount $ Percentage % Amount $ Percentage % Amount $ Percentage % Amount $ Percentage % Amount $ Percentage % Amount $ Percentage % 
Labor 11.0 52.4 11.5 33.1 18.6 24.0 25.1 19.1 35.0 18.4 47.4 17.9 
Corporate 8.1 38.6 5.8 11.0 39.0 50.3 63.4 48. 4 84.9 44.6 112.9 42.3 
Noncon 
nected 
0.8 3.8 - - 17.4 22.5 38.6 29.4 64.6 33.9 95.9 36.2 
Other 1.1 5.2 29.6 56.0 2.4 3.1 4.0 3.1 5.8 3.0 8.8 3.3 
Total 21.0 100 52.9 100 77.4 100 131.1 100 190.3 100 265.0 100 
Source: Collected by Adamany and printed in "The New Faces of American Politics" (1986). Based on various FEC election 
reports. 
 The difference in organization capabilities of corporate or union related interest groups has 
led, in general, to business friendly legislation. Tax rates on high incomes were reduced sharply, 
corporate tax rates reduced, carried interest laws implemented, many costs of doing business were 
made tax deductible and business gained many tax rebates (Pierson and Hacker 2010, 52). The effect 
of these beneficial policies was that that the relative power resources of corporate interest groups 
improved immensely over the years. The effectiveness of government to shape the markets also had 
an indirect effect. More and more interest groups, mostly corporate groups, turned towards D.C. as 
13 
 
lobbying proved to be a sound investment. New groups wanted to be represented in DC to gain more 
benefits and also out of fear of being left out.  
The Mechanism of Institutional Redesign 
The dominant influence of corporate interest groups, as described in the previous part, is however 
not only determined by the relative power resources of the different social groups but also on the 
basis of if and how resources can be converted into political influence. A social group with impressive 
financial or human resources that cannot convert these resources efficiently into political influence 
will find it difficult to realize its policy goals. This makes the institutions regulating how groups can 
influence politics a valuable policy objectives (Steinmo and Tolbert 1998). Two important institutions 
are explored in this paper: how resources can be utilized to influence the policy process – The Arms 
Race of Interest Representation – and the structure of consultation during the policy formation 
process – Unorganized Government-Interest group relations.  
These examples do not cover all the relevant institutions regulating government-interest 
group relations. For example, how decisions are made in the policy process has a profound effect on 
the ability of groups to influence the policy formation process. Often used systemic variables here are 
the fragmentation of government and the number of veto players in the policy process. A 
fragmented policy process has many openings for interests groups (Kitschelt 1986) and many veto 
players increases the possibility of blocking unwanted legislation (Tsebelis 2002; Pierson and Hacker 
2010). However, there are no theoretical expectations regarding which group would benefit from 
which structure. Therefore, the rules of the decision making during policy formation process cannot 
be used as a systemic variable that prominent groups would like to change to enhance their own 
influence on the policy formation process. 
Two important rules regulating how interest groups can influence the policy formation are 
explored next: how resources can be utilized to influence the policy process and the structure of 
consultation during the policy formation process. Both of these rules can determine which social 
groups eventual succeeds and which doesn’t. Therefore the expectation is that both rules not only 
regulate interest groups but that alterations of these rules are policy goals of interests groups.   
The Arms Race of Interest Representation 
One of the most important rules determining which group wins or loses is the regulation of financial 
contributions to politicians and Political Action Committees (PACs). Legislation prohibiting the flow of 
money from groups to political agents neutralized the difference in financial resources between 
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groups to a certain extend. It creates a more even level playing field where groups with limited 
financial resources can also compete for influence. A lack of regulation, or enforcement, of such rules 
creates a competition between groups where those with the largest purse are in a favorable position. 
Such a competition between interest groups to influence politicians can be perceived as an arms race: 
different groups use strategies that optimize the likelihood that their message reaches legislators 
rather than the message of competing interest groups. If one group finds a more effective method of 
influencing politicians other interest groups have to follow this example or loose influence (Gray and 
Lowery 1997, 322). Interests groups are in a competition with each other for political influence. In 
this zero-sum game interest groups have to adapt to new developments or “their” interests will be 
less effectively represented. 
The struggle for attention between interest groups is decided on basis of how much 
resources each group has and how effectively the different interest groups can convert their 
resources into influence. Important resources are the number of lobbyists, size of the grassroots 
movement, expertise and people with connections. The most important resources is probably the 
financial cloud of an interest group. As mentioned earlier “with a little money they [politicians] hear 
you better” (As quoted in Gray and Lowery 1997, 322). The struggle for attention changed profoundly 
in the 1970s as business related interest groups followed the example of social movements and 
moved to Washington (See table 2, page 12). With the influence of the new American state becoming 
so large, in comparison with earlier stages, companies found it necessary and profitable to lobby in 
Washington. The growth of business related lobbying capabilities was encompassed by an equally 
fast development of appetite and capabilities to tap into these rich resources by the major political 
parties. Especially the Republican Party, historically the natural partner of business interests, realized 
the potential of this development and created the institutional machinery necessary to harvest these 
resources (Adamany 1986, 15; Pierson and Hacker 2010, 159). The result was that by 1980 the 
Republican Party was raising almost four times as much funds as the Democratic Party. This financial 
advantage was partially responsible for the Republican rise at the end of the seventies. 
While organized business interests became the dominant interest group, their influence is 
not without limitations. The most important constraint on the maneuverability of politicians is the 
voters. If politicians want to be reelected they have to respect voters’ preferences to a certain extent. 
Having superior financial resources as corporate sector is an advantage, but converting this 
advantage into policy influence requires influence on the electoral process. However, using money to 
influence the election process was a contested topic after the Watergate scandal and the role of 
unregulated and unknown financial contributions in creating and sustaining the corrupt practices of 
President Nixon. In 1974 the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) was amended. The most 
important changes were the limits on financial contributions and the requirement for public 
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disclosure. However, even before the ink was dry the 1974 FECA amendments were challenged in 
court (Clark and Lichtman 2006). It was argued by the plaintiffs that the limitations on financial 
contributions were an unconstitutional restriction on the freedom of speech.  The Supreme Court 
eventually sided with the plaintiffs in the “Buckley v. Valeo” case in 1976 and struck down several 
integral parts of the FECA 1974 amendments. The Supreme Court declared it illegal to apply universal 
and mandatory limitation of political spending. After the verdict Congress had to act again. It could 
side with the Supreme Court or enact new legislation, possibly a constitutional amendment, which 
would restrict financial contributions again. 
In 1977 and 1979 Congress enacted a new set of FECA amendments. In 1977 Congress 
determined, following the Supreme Court ruling in “Buckley v. Valeo”, that limitations on 
expenditures undertaken independently from politicians by Political Action Committees (PACS) or 
individuals on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate cannot be limited (Wertheimer 1986, 96). 
Additionally direct contributions to politicians or political parties were limited. This was done to 
safeguard the integrity of elections and avoid the appearance of corruption (Clark and Lichtman 
2006, 637).  
Labor unions considered the rapid rise of corporate PACs as a threat to American democracy 
and their own position (Alexander 1980, 659). The fear was that corporations would soon marginalize 
unions if the number of corporate PACs and financial resources of corporate PACs kept growing as it 
had until then. In order to curve the influence of PACs a bill was proposed by liberal Democrats and 
Republicans to lower the amount of money a politician may receive from one PAC to $2.500 and the 
total sum to $50.000. The Obey-Railsback bill, named after its Democratic and Republican sponsor, 
attracted more than twenty Republican cosponsors. Obey stated that PAC money had to be limited 
to stop the race between politicians for PAC contributions. Without regulation PAC money would 
continue to grow like “we have a new arms race on our hands, only the arm, instead of missiles, are 
campaign dollars; Whatever business does one year, labor does the next” (Quoted in Alexander 1980, 
662). The AFL-CIO union and Common Cause, a liberal interest group, also supported the bill. 
Common Cause president Fred Wertheimer contended that “unless there are some controls on the 
PAC movement, we will see no controls for some time, if at all” (Quoted in Alexander 1980, 659). The 
goal of the reduction in PAC contributions to individual candidates was to make candidates less 
dependent on wealthy PACs and more responsive to a wide variety of donors. 
Reducing the amount of money PACs could give to politicians was opposed by the Republican 
Policy Committee and the many organizations which interpreted the emergence of PACs as a positive 
development in American politics (Alexander 1980, 659-660). The Republican Policy Committee 
maintained that the bill would “restrict full participation in our election process” (Quoted in 
Alexander 1980, 659). Organizations as the National Association of Manufacturers, the American 
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Medical Association, the Business-Industry Political Action Committee and Chamber of Commerce 
were all in favor of rejecting the bill. The Chamber argued that the claim that corporate PACs were 
too influential could not be true as corporate PACs only gave a small portion of the total 
contributions (Alexander 1980, 660). The opponents of the bill appeared to suffer a defeat as the 
Obey-Railsback bill was approved in the House, a bipartisan 219-197 vote. As it turned out, this 
defeat was a strategic move by opponents. Several opponents promised to vote for the House bill if it 
would be postponed till after the recess. This gave them time to organize their resistance in the 
Senate.  This tactic paid off as the Senate version of the bill was sidetracked eventually in the Senate 
Rules Committee; it never reached the Senate floor for an official vote. If it had, it would have been 
filibustered (Alexander 1980, 665). As a result the money flowing to and through PACs stayed mostly 
unlimited and unregulated, leading to an explosion of PAC contributions and influence of the 
organizations behind the PACs. 
The clear loser of the growth in PAC influence and financial strength were the political parties 
themselves and the grassroots movements. Money was now flowing to PACs and politicians had to 
“work” with PACs to ensure their contributions. What the effect is of the influence of PACs on 
politicians is contested. The consensus is that PACs don’t tell politicians how to vote, but there is a 
strong overlap between the ideology of PACs and the politicians they are contributing to (Adamany 
1986, 25). The introduction of PACs has induced politicians to take certain political positions and 
increased the financial gap between candidates. There is an “invisible election” where politicians vie 
for the support of resource rich groups. To ensure that parties would keep their prominent position 
and also profit from the influx of money the FECA was amended again in 1979. This time the 
limitation of contributions to political parties was altered. Until then political parties had to operate 
in the complex web of federal and state legislation. They had to comply with both types of legislation. 
The 1979 FECA amendments solved this “problem” by splitting financial contributions to political 
parties into campaign contributions and party expenditures. Contribution to a political campaign 
stayed heavily regulated and limited. But contributions for party building were exempt from federal 
legislation. Party building was a local activity and should thus only be regulated by state law (Wides 
and Scott 1995, 23). The result of this division of political contributions is the now infamous influx of 
“soft money”. This money was supposed to be spend on actual party building activities, but it did not 
define what a party building activity is. Political parties could now use unregulated and unlimited 
sums of money on activities that would help the party. The Federal Election Committee in 1984 had 
to admit that it could not really make a distinction between promoting a candidate and promoting a 
party, as long as the activity was not explicitly linked to the candidate it was supposed to support 
(Clark and Lichtman 2006, 639). The 1979 FECA amendment did not even have a disclosure 
requirement. Parties could thus spend money on “party activities” without having to disclose how 
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much money was being spend. The Federal Election Commission stated itself that “soft money is one 
of the most difficult issue the Commission had to address during the last twenty years” (quoted in 
Wides and Scott 1995, 23). 
The influx and importance of money in political campaigns would probably have happened 
regardless of the legislation of politicians. New technology, especially mass-mail appeals, has  led to 
an increase in fundraising (Adamany 1986, 15-16). It is still remarkable that legislation enabling and 
or sanctioning the increase in financial contributions was supported by both parties. The difference in 
fundraising between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party was so large that it would have 
made sense if the Democratic Party had been suspicious of more money in politics. The Republican 
Party was raising four times as much money as the Democratic Party. An explanation for the 
bipartisan support for reduced limitations on campaign finance could be the favorable position of all 
politicians, Democrats and Republicans, compared with challengers. Between 1978 and 1982 68 
percent of the money contributed by PACs to House elections went to incumbents. In the Senate 68 
percent of this money went to incumbents (Adamany 1986, 21). In 1984 the difference had become 
even larger, 82% of the PAC contributions went to incumbents (Wertheimer 1986, 92). Everyone 
voting on the Federal Election Campaign Act is an incumbent, so it is in their own interest to increase 
the influx of campaign contribution. They themselves were one of the biggest benefactors of these 
changes. The fundraising advantage an incumbent has over challengers could also result in private 
financial gains. Until the FECA amendments of 1979 it was prohibited to convert campaign funds into 
personal funds after leaving Congress. But the 1979 amendments also included an exemption from 
that rule for all members of Congress on that moment.  Members of Congress made a rule that only 
applied to themselves and which would benefit them greatly. Members of Congress at that time had 
up to $600.000 in their war chest, money they could keep themselves if they left politics 
(Werdheimer 1986, 100). 
Congress chose to open the floodgates and allow unregulated money to flow into politics. 
This favored corporate interest groups, incumbent politicians and the parties. For politicians and the 
parties it meant more financial resources during campaigns – and sometimes for retirement. 
Corporate interest groups have deep pockets and were one of the most active supporters of these 
changes. Their financial advantage over other interest groups would enable them to speak even 
louder if some of the restrictions on financial contributions were removed. Therefore it made sense 
for corporate interest groups to have the removal on limitations of financial contributions as one of 
their main policy objectives. The losers are interest groups with smaller purses like the unions and 
politicians advocating issues that corporate groups disagree with. Being ideological mostly in line 
with corporate interest groups became a necessity for political survival. Politicians that didn’t play 
along were in danger of finding a well-financed challenger in the next election. Both the removal of 
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politicians with ideas not shared by corporate interest groups and the decline of influence of other, 
less well financed, interest groups increased the probability of the preferences of corporate interest 
groups to be transformed into law. A financial arms race between interests groups decreases the 
chance of redistributive policies being enacted in the United States, where income, and thus financial 
resources, is concentrated more and more in the hands of the few. Removing restrictions on financial 
contributions increases the effectiveness of how financial resources are converted into political 
influence and leverages the effect of policies affecting income distribution. The result is a stronger 
feedback process: more resources are collected by the already dominant groups and these groups 
can use such resources more effective. As the feedback loop becomes more powerful, the policy path 
becomes more rigid and a change of direction harder to achieve. Thus, income inequality leads to 
more income inequality and a political system that is friendlier to those with resources. Mitigating 
this development with redistributive policies becomes harder as the asymmetry in power between 
groups increases and the political system is redesigned. 
 
Unorganized Government – Interest Group Relations 
The difference in organization capabilities between interest groups is large in the United States – as 
demonstrated earlier. There are however structures of government-interest relations that mitigate 
the differences in capabilities. In an organized environment like corporatism or tripartism selected 
weaker groups are empowered and given a stronger voice in the policy formation process (Baxter 
2011, 191-192). For social groups it is important that the institutional benefits them, or at least is 
neutral.  
The US has a remarkably unorganized system of interest representation. No peak 
organizations represent either employers or the employees in consultative bodies where government 
and social groups meet. The lack of organization and hierarchy creates a system supposedly 
characterized by equality of opportunity. The system is open to all organizations and interest groups 
who compete based on their power resources. According to Gordon (1998, 40) in such a unorganized 
environemnt coalitions of interest groups ad-hoc react with a tendency of political short-sightedness 
to threats or opportunities. In such an environment corporate interest groups can prosper and 
leverage their organizational capabilities optimal. It is a favorable environment because business 
related interest groups have the most resources at their disposal since their organizational push in 
the seventies (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 156; Baxter 2011, 191-192) and there is the “privileged 
position of business” (Lindblom 1977). According to Lindblom (1977) politicians have a natural 
tendency to listen to business people. Politicians need business too much. This enables corporate 
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interest groups to be heard more often than other interest groups and thus have a disproportionate 
influence on the policy making process. 
The prominent position of business related interests groups can be explained using Olson’s 
The Logic of Collective Action (1971). Until Olson’s work it was assumed that interests in society 
would be represented equally to their importance in society. Olson demonstrated that not all 
interests will automatically be represented by interests groups. This concerns the free rider problem 
and variation in resources that can be used for selective benefits to overcome the free rider problem. 
According to Olsen, this results in an interest community representing mainly the well-off and well 
organized. From a class based perspective this is often translated into a domination of corporate 
interest groups (McDonnel 1966, Lowi 1969, West 2000). The difference in incentives to organize can 
directly be linked to differences in power resources. The more unequal the distribution of income, 
the more income is concentrated in the hands of a few and the easier it is for members of this group 
to overcome the collective action problem. A measure of income distribution can thus be regarded as 
a multiplier of how effective resources of different groups in society are used to influence policies. An 
unequal income society results in both, the top earners have more financial resources than other 
groups and it is more likely that these resources will be utilized to influence the policy process. 
The advantage of corporate interest groups in an unorganized system does not automatically 
mean that a structured relationship between government and interest groups would be 
disadvantageous for corporate interests. For instance, the close relationship between politicians, 
bureaucrats and corporate interests groups in the Iron Triangles of the decades after the Second 
World War were advantageous to the corporate interest groups (Vogel 1989, 16-17). However, when 
these Iron Triangles were broken up by nationalizing the issues being discussed in these networks, 
the business related interest groups lost their powerful positions (Schattschneider 1975). Although 
business related interest groups might indeed have lost their influential position in the policy making 
process, it was important for them to ensure that the way government-interest relations would be 
structured next was not be disadvantageous to their interests. Given the organizational capabilities 
of business related interest groups it is preferable for them to have an unorganized interest group 
environment over a structured interest group environment where representative interest 
organizations of the groups involved would all have a place at the table. Weaker groups are 
empowered to compensate for their weaker position in society in an organized environment as 
corporatism or tripartism (Baxter 2011, 191-192). The expectation is that the outcome of such a 
process is more balanced because the asymmetrical power relations in society have been 
neutralized. 
The replacement of the closed structure by an unorganized structure was not self-evident. 
The United States has a short history of government created consultation bodies, giving corporatism 
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its place in American history. Trade organizations were actively organized and given a role in 
formulating government polices during the First World War, the Great Depression and the Second 
World War. The consultation bodies were mostly founded in order to create support for and to 
implement far reaching federal regulatory programs (Salisbury 1994, 467-8). At the end of the sixties 
and during the early seventies President Nixon and later President Ford pushed for the socialization 
of economic issues. A tripartite machinery was created to bring together labor, business and 
government to try dealing with the aftermath of the first oil crisis. An attempt was made to socialize 
economic issues. Until then such issues had been considered private affairs between employer and 
the individual worker. If needed issues were dealt with in bilateral discussions between government 
and employer or employee groups. The socialization of economic issues as happened in the late 
sixties and early seventies, thus without an emergency situation, was considered as the arrival of the 
corporate state in America (Fusfeld 1972; Peterson 1974).  
However, American corporatism never really thrived. Peak organizations representing 
employees had difficulty in organizing workers and achieving a sufficient level of representation. 
Unions have never been popular in the United States and corporations increased their efforts to 
dismantle unions because of the economic hardship of the seventies. Fewer unions would mean 
lower wages, a much needed competitive advantage. The effort of the National Labor Relations 
Board to regulate representative elections in corporations threatened corporate interests. The labor 
law reform of 1978 was supposed to make corporate elections easier to conduct, increase the 
penalties for companies that did not comply, and, most important, impose a position of non-
interference or neutrality towards unions on companies. According to proponents of the Labor Law 
reform of ‘78 the opinion of the company is often difficult for employees to neglect because of the 
superior economic position of companies. Any “advice” a company gives carries an inherent 
suggestion of economic reprisals. To avoid economic retaliation having an effect on elections, verbal 
interference by business owners during elections was going to be considered an infringement of the 
employees right to a free and fair representative election and, therefore, constituting an unfair labor 
practice (Editors 1979, 755). 
The proposal to streamline corporate elections and keep the employer out of the elections 
was already a compromise. More radical parts like a guarantee that union representation would have 
to be respected after a merger or acquisition of the company were dropped after consultation with 
the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable (Fink 1998, 246). President Carter described 
the proposal as “legislation to make the laws which govern labor-management relations work more 
efficiently, quickly and equitably and to ensure that our labor laws fulfill the promise made to 
employees and employers…that working men and women who wish to bargain collectively with their 
employers, in a fair way to both, shall have a reasonable and prompt chance to do so” (Carter 1977). 
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In spite of the watered down legislation, Democratic majorities in both houses and a Democratic 
President, the bill was never signed into law. Business organizations, sensing the weakness of 
organized labor, started an all-out campaign against the labor reform bill. Organizations like The 
Business Roundtable, The National Association of Manufacturers, The Small Business Administration 
and The Chamber of Commerce opposed the bill fiercely. The Small Business Administration (1978) 
declared the bill a “job killer, anti-employee and anti-small business”. Business groups allied 
themselves with, or created groups like, the Committee to defeat the Union Bosses, the Committee 
for a Union Free Environment, the Right-to-Work Committee and the Americans Against Union 
Control of Government Committee. Business interest groups also went national. Public opinion was 
influenced with articles, open letters, advertisements and editorials in newspapers and magazines. In 
these public relations efforts unions were depicted as corrupt organizations making a power play that 
would hurt the normal worker. As a result legislators were confronted with a tsunami of letters, calls 
and personal appeals. Especially small business owners were ever present in the lobbies and 
corridors of Congress (Cowie 2010, 211). One Senator described the labor law reform as “one of the 
most emotional issues to reach the Senate in years” (Fink 1998, 249). Every possibility to influence 
the process was used to ensure it would not pass. 
Encouraged by the intensity of the opposition a small group of Senators led a long but 
successful filibuster again the labor reform. Senators Orrin Hatch (R. Utah) and Richard Lugar (R. 
Indiana) took the Senate floor for almost five weeks. Democratic majority leader Byrd attempted a 
total of six cloture votes, but failed in every attempt. The closest he got was 58 votes. Two shy of the 
required sixty to invoke cloture. During the filibuster the labor reform bill was altered several times 
to try and reach a compromise with the opposition. But all efforts were in vain. In the end Senator 
Byrd saw no other solution than to recommit the labor reform bill back to the Human Resource 
Committee. This was a strategic action, but a defeat none the less. Labor law reform had once again 
been defeated, despite labor’s best efforts and the formal Democratic control of the Congress and 
the presidency. 
The consequences of the stringent defeat of labor reached further than stopping the 
contents of the labor reform law. Union leaders deemed it inappropriate and useless to take part in 
the Labor Management Group, the last and most visible manifestation of corporate liberalism after 
the Second World War, after being furiously attacked by business leaders. Douglas Fraser, president 
of the United Automobile Workers, wrote a damning letter accusing business of sitting at a table 
negotiating with labor while waging a "dishonest and ugly multimillion-dollar campaign against the 
labor law reform bill” (Fraser 1978). The leaders of industry, commerce and finance were waging an 
"one-sided class war against labor" and “had broken and discarded the fragile, unwritten compact 
previously existing during a past period of growth and progress” (Fraser 1978). AFL-CIO president 
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Lane Kirkland advocated that if the National Labor Relations Act could not be amended it should be 
repealed. Corporate interest groups had turned the National Labor Relations Act in a weapon against 
labor (Fink 1998, 252). Industrial pluralism, to the extent that it had ever really existed, died with the 
dissolvent of the Labor Management Groups. 
As described, corporations avoided the socialization of labor-industry issues by stopping 
unions from organizing and being represented in consultative bodies in the seventies. Corporate 
interest groups purposely pushed towards an unorganized structure of interest representation. 
Interest representation was no longer, if ever, to be done in an organized hierarchical structure but in 
the political arena. Free competition for influence determined by organizational capabilities. 
Competition that is favorable to corporate interest because of their organization advantage over 
other groups. By realizing an arena of interest representation corporate in interest groups increasing 
the probability of realizing their other policy objective: business friendly legislation. As time 
progressed income became more concentrated in the hands of the few and the possibility of 
institutional alterations to compensate for the concentration of income only dwindled. As long as 
those with resources will have a say in the formation of policies no organized structure will be creates 
that neutralizes the difference in resources. Unless big changes are expected, no group in an 
influential position will undermine their own influence by creating an organized structure of interest 
representation that empowers their competition. 
 
Conclusion 
The observation that American politicians respond to a rising income inequality with marginal 
redistributive policies can be explained the best using Korpi’s Power Resource Theory. Corporations 
sought more influence in Washington D.C. as economic prospects diminished in the seventies and the 
American activist state had become more important. Subsequently corporate interests groups 
managed to win several crucial political battles in the late seventies because of their new gained 
organizational capabilities,. The success of corporate interest groups incentivized other corporations 
also to set up camp in D.C. The asymmetrical power relationship between corporate interest groups 
and ordinary citizens, mainly represented by the unions, shifted more in favor of the corporations 
with each additional policy objective that was realized. The probability of reproducing policies 
favoring corporate interests increased as this power relation became more and more an unequal 
relationship. 
The pattern of primary income distributions and redistributive policies is, however, not only 
the result of an asymmetrical power relationship between corporate and union interest groups. 
Power resources have to be converted into influence on the policy formation process. It are political 
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institutions that determine how this conversion transpires and often decide which social group wins 
or loses in the contest for influence. Because institutions are endogenous to the policy process, 
groups can attempt to redesign institutions which regulate how interest groups interact with the 
government. During the formative years 1975 – 1985 corporate interest groups managed to do so. 
They redesigned important institutions, or block the altering of institutions by unions, and secure 
that the conversion of power resources into political influence in the United States was favorable to 
themselves. This secured the capacity of corporate interest groups to reproduce policies that are 
aligned with their respective objectives in the future. In other words, because corporate interest 
groups were in a prominent position they were able to alter the rules regulating how interest groups 
influence the policy formation process and increased their future influence. 
Two examples were used of how corporate interests groups solidified their future 
prominence in the American policy formation process: the structure of American interest 
representation and the regulations on the conversion of financial resources into political influence. In 
the seventies, corporate interests were threatened by the socialization of economic issues. The 
tripartisme set up by President Nixon gave organizations representing workers and corporations a 
voice in economic policies. Corporations resisted this socialization and chose an adversarial stance. 
Consultation and compromise was forgone in favor of a contest for influence. The choice for a 
contest instead of cooperation was a safe bet given the organizational advantages of corporate 
interest groups. Advantages that were expected to increase over time. To optimize the effectiveness 
of their organizational advantage, corporate interest groups also pushed for less restrictions on 
financial contributions. With little restrictions on financial contributions, corporate interest groups 
could effectively use their financial advantage over social movements or unions. Thus, removing 
restrictions on money in politics created an environment that was friendlier to corporate interest 
groups than to other groups. Moreover, corporate interest groups were guaranteed access to 
politicians once it became necessary for every politician to raise large sums of money for his or her 
campaign.  As the old saying goes: He who pays the piper calls the tune. 
The prominent position of corporate interest groups in the American political system is not 
only the result of their advantage in organizational capabilities. Because of the influence they gained, 
corporate interest groups were able to redesign parts of the American political system, i.e. the 
political institutions. Those alterations made the system friendlier to them and less to rival interest 
groups. This led to an exponential increase in corporate influence. Both the power resources of 
corporate interests increased and the conversion of these power resources into political influence 
was improved. The two parts of the feedback process, resources and institutions, function as 
multipliers. The combination of alterations in the power relation and institutions created an ever 
more stable path of influence. 
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Implications and Further research 
The described policy patterns and the role of institutional alterations in repeating policy choices is 
only a small first step. In this paper the theoretical background and functioning of institutional 
alteration have been described. There are however several questions left unanswered. 
Two elements of the linkage between interest groups and the political process interaction 
are explored in this paper. It concerns an unstructured relationship between interest groups and the 
government, and the financial contributions of interest groups to the political process. These are the 
more obvious inclusions. The implications of the two choices had already been theorized and could 
be used. There are, of course, more options available to interests groups than the two options 
applied in this study. If, and how, interest groups can utilize institutional alterations like 
fragmentation of the political system is not yet fully theorized. Examples of this could be the number 
of veto points or bureaucratic discrepancies in the political arena. More research into the effects of 
such issues on the political system and which groups benefit from this is desirable. 
It is also necessary to increase the scope of the research, both in terms of time and countries. 
The developments in the United States during the late seventies might have been instrumental in the 
subsequent policy pattern, but changes during later stadia of the pattern should also be part of the 
research. It is important to examine if comparable institutional changes have been realized in a later 
stage of the process. A continued pressure on institutions and, sometimes, alteration of the 
institutions into the same direction would demonstrate the relevance and value of these alterations. 
It is also important to include more countries in the research. The institutional alterations described 
in the United States, or comparable in terms of effect, should also be visible in other Anglo-American 
countries. It is expected that a comparable pressure to redesign institutions should be present in the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. The Nordic countries should have experienced different 
institutional developments. The expectation is that the institutions in those countries were altered to 
compensate for developments in their society, and neutralized, to a certain extent, the difference in 
resources between social groups. 
The notion that alterations to the rules of the game are an important prize for groups is 
already present in path dependence literature (Hacker and Pierson 2014, 649). However, this concept 
is underdeveloped. In the literature it is not much more than a “lock-out” mechanism that ensures 
path dependence by making future alterations impossible (Pierson 2000, 262). In reality many more 
nuanced alterations to how decisions are reached can be made. This mechanism is especially 
important and potent in politics. As stated earlier, in politics the rules of how decisions are made are 
endogenous to the policy formation process. In the economy, where the mechanism of path 
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dependence was first developed, this is absent. Besides the central role of collective action problems, 
the high density of institutions, asymmetrical political authority and power and the opacity of politics 
alternations to the decision making process itself could also be reasons why a positive feedback 
process is often present in politics. More research is needed to identify which changes in rules are 
used to increase the chance of reproduction of choices and how different groups can use such 
alterations to their advantage.  
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